Condensed: Accused persons shall (a) save in exceptional circumstances (b) be segregated from convicted prisoners and (c) be given separate treatment appropriate to their status as unconvicted persons. The term accused person means any person deprived of liberty except as a result of conviction for an offence. States have an obligation to establish a classification system for detained persons.
Comprehensive: Article 10(2)(a) of the ICCPR provides that ‘accused persons shall, (a) save in exceptional circumstances, (b) be segregated from convicted persons and (c) shall be subject to separate treatment appropriate to their status as unconvicted persons’. Similar provisions are found in other international and regional human rights instruments.[1] The term ‘accused person’ refers to any person deprived of personal liberty except as a result of conviction for an offence.[2] It includes persons detained for other reasons than on suspicion of having committed an offence, for example persons detained pending deportation. The requirement established in article 10(2)(a) implies that prisoners should be ‘kept in separate quarters (but not necessarily in separate buildings)’.[3] States have an obligation to establish a classification system for detained persons.[4] The HRC held in Pinkney v Canada that it was not a violation of article 10(2)(a) to have ‘convicted persons work as food servers and cleaners in the remand area … provided that contacts between the two classes of prisoners are kept strictly to a minimum necessary for the performance of those tasks.’[5] The European Prison Rules provide that exceptions to the segregation of prisoners may be done ‘in order to allow prisoners to participate jointly in organised activities, but these groups shall always be separated at night unless they consent to be detained together and the prison authorities judge that it would be in the best interest of all the prisoners concerned.’[6] In Gorji -Dinka v Cameroon, the complainant had been detained on political charges and ‘was initially kept in a cell with 20 murder convicts at the headquarters of the Brigade mixte mobile’. The HRC held that the state had violated article 10(2)(a) of the ICCPR as it had ‘not adduced any exceptional circumstances which would have justified its failure to segregate the author from such convicts in order to emphasize his status as an unconvicted person.’[7] In Cabal and Bertran v Australia the complainants argued that they had not been ‘subject to separate treatment appropriate to their status as unconvicted persons’. The HRC declared the communication inadmissible as ‘in many respects the authors were provided with separate treatment in relation to such privileges as the right to wear their own clothes, making telephone calls and being permitted to eat their own food.’[8] See also *separate immigration detention facilities*.
[1] Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (SMR) rule 8(2); ACHR art 5(4); Arab Charter art 20; European Prison Rules art 18(8)(a).[2] SMR rule 84(1). [3]Pinkney v Canada communication 27/1977 (HRC 1981) para 30. See also para 147. [4]Neptune v Haiti (IACtHR 2008) para 146. [5] As above. [6] European Prison Rules art 18(9). [7]Gorji-Dinka v Cameroon communication 1134/2002 (HRC 2005) para 5.3. See also Komarovski v Turkmenistan communication 1450/2006 (HRC 2008) para 7.5; Lewis v Jamaica communication 708/1996 (HRC 1997) para 8.5; Morrison v Jamaica 663/1995 (HRC 1998); Griffin v Spain communication 493/1992 (HRC 1995) para 9.4; Berry v Jamaica communication 330/1988 (HRC 1994) para 11.2; Wolf v Panama communication 289/1988 (HRC 1992) para 6.8; López Álvarez v Honduras (IACtHR 2006) para 112; Neptune v Haiti (IACtHR 2008) para 150; Tibi v Ecuador (IACtHR 2005) para 158. [8]Cabal and Bertran v Australia communication 1020/2001 (HRC 2003) para 7.5.
Accused persons shall (a) save in exceptional circumstances (b) be segregated from convicted prisoners and (c) be given separate treatment appropriate to their status as unconvicted persons. The term accused person means any person deprived of liberty except as a result of conviction for an offence. States have an obligation to establish a classification system for detained persons.
Comprehensive:
Article 10(2)(a) of the ICCPR provides that ‘accused persons shall, (a) save in exceptional circumstances, (b) be segregated from convicted persons and (c) shall be subject to separate treatment appropriate to their status as unconvicted persons’. Similar provisions are found in other international and regional human rights instruments.[1] The term ‘accused person’ refers to any person deprived of personal liberty except as a result of conviction for an offence.[2] It includes persons detained for other reasons than on suspicion of having committed an offence, for example persons detained pending deportation.
The requirement established in article 10(2)(a) implies that prisoners should be ‘kept in separate quarters (but not necessarily in separate buildings)’.[3] States have an obligation to establish a classification system for detained persons.[4] The HRC held in Pinkney v Canada that it was not a violation of article 10(2)(a) to have ‘convicted persons work as food servers and cleaners in the remand area … provided that contacts between the two classes of prisoners are kept strictly to a minimum necessary for the performance of those tasks.’[5] The European Prison Rules provide that exceptions to the segregation of prisoners may be done ‘in order to allow prisoners to participate jointly in organised activities, but these groups shall always be separated at night unless they consent to be detained together and the prison authorities judge that it would be in the best interest of all the prisoners concerned.’[6]
In Gorji -Dinka v Cameroon, the complainant had been detained on political charges and ‘was initially kept in a cell with 20 murder convicts at the headquarters of the Brigade mixte mobile’. The HRC held that the state had violated article 10(2)(a) of the ICCPR as it had ‘not adduced any exceptional circumstances which would have justified its failure to segregate the author from such convicts in order to emphasize his status as an unconvicted person.’[7]
In Cabal and Bertran v Australia the complainants argued that they had not been ‘subject to separate treatment appropriate to their status as unconvicted persons’. The HRC declared the communication inadmissible as ‘in many respects the authors were provided with separate treatment in relation to such privileges as the right to wear their own clothes, making telephone calls and being permitted to eat their own food.’[8]
See also *separate immigration detention facilities*.
[1] Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (SMR) rule 8(2); ACHR art 5(4); Arab Charter art 20; European Prison Rules art 18(8)(a).[2] SMR rule 84(1).
[3] Pinkney v Canada communication 27/1977 (HRC 1981) para 30. See also para 147.
[4] Neptune v Haiti (IACtHR 2008) para 146.
[5] As above.
[6] European Prison Rules art 18(9).
[7] Gorji-Dinka v Cameroon communication 1134/2002 (HRC 2005) para 5.3. See also Komarovski v Turkmenistan communication 1450/2006 (HRC 2008) para 7.5; Lewis v Jamaica communication 708/1996 (HRC 1997) para 8.5; Morrison v Jamaica 663/1995 (HRC 1998); Griffin v Spain communication 493/1992 (HRC 1995) para 9.4; Berry v Jamaica communication 330/1988 (HRC 1994) para 11.2; Wolf v Panama communication 289/1988 (HRC 1992) para 6.8; López Álvarez v Honduras (IACtHR 2006) para 112; Neptune v Haiti (IACtHR 2008) para 150; Tibi v Ecuador (IACtHR 2005) para 158.
[8] Cabal and Bertran v Australia communication 1020/2001 (HRC 2003) para 7.5.