4.1.2 Right to manifest one’s religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance [ICCPR art 18(1) and (3)]
Condensed:

The right to freedom of religion or belief includes freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. Worship refers to ritual and ceremonial acts giving direct expression to religion or belief such as religious prayer and preaching. Observance includes not only ceremonial acts but also such customs as the observance of dietary regulations, the wearing of distinctive clothing or headcoverings, beards, amongst others. Teaching includes acts integral to the conduct by religious groups of their basic affairs, while practice overlaps with both observance and teaching.

Limitations may be applied only for those purposes for which they were prescribed by law and must be directly related and proportionate to the specific need on which they are predicated. Banning the wearing of headscarves and beards by students in state-run universities in Turkey to preserve the secular nature of the institution served a legitimate aim of protecting public order and was held to be proportionate. In contrast, the expulsion of a student for refusing to comply with a ban on the wearing of headscarves is a violation of the right to manifest religion where the ban is done without the state invoking any specific ground or justification for imposing the restriction.

Comprehensive:

The right to freedom of religion or belief, as recognized under article 18(1) of the ICCPR, includes ‘freedom, either individually**[1]** or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.’[2] This right is the active or public dimension of the freedom of religion or belief in that it is the freedom to live one’s life in accordance with one’s religion or belief.[3] (Cf *right to hold, adopt or change a religion or belief*.)

Worship refers to ritual and ceremonial acts giving direct expression to religion or belief such as religious prayer and preaching as well as practices integral to such acts.[4] Observance includes not only ceremonial acts but also such customs as the observance of dietary regulations, the wearing of distinctive clothing or headcoverings,[5] beards,[6] participation in rituals associated with certain stages of life, and the use of a particular language customarily spoken by a group.[7]

Teaching includes acts integral to the conduct by religious groups of their basic affairs, such as the freedom to choose their religious leaders, priests and teachers, the freedom to establish seminaries or religious schools and the freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts or publications.[8] Practice overlaps with both observance and teaching as it refers to practices required by a religion or a belief. However, practice does not cover all acts motivated or influenced by a religion or belief and one does not necessarily have the right to behave in the public sphere in a manner dictated by a religion or belief. For example where a Turkish soldier was forcibly retired for having supported a fundamentalist sect, the ECtHR held that his freedom of religion had not been violated.[9]

In contrast to the right to hold, adopt or change religion or belief, the right to manifest one’s religion or belief may be subject to limitations that are ‘prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.’ Limitations must be established by law that is both adequately accessible to the individual and formulated with sufficient precision to regulate conduct.[10]

In interpreting the scope of permissible limitation clauses, states should proceed from the need to protect the rights.[11] Limitations may be applied only for those purposes for which they were prescribed by law and must be directly related[12] and proportionate to[13] the specific need on which they are predicated.[14] Restrictions may not be imposed for discriminatory purposes or applied in a discriminatory manner.[15]

With respect to public safety, the HRC held that requiring a Sikh who wears a turban in daily life to wear a safety-helmet at work does not violate his right to religious freedom as it is intended to ensure the safety of employees from injury and electric shock.[16] The ECtHR held that, in refusing to officially recognize the Church of Bessarabia, the government of Moldova was pursuing a legitimate aim of protecting public safety and public order by protecting against the revival of long-standing rivalries between Russia and Romania which could endanger the social peace and territorial integrity of Moldova.[17] However, the Court held that to not recognize the church was disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.[18]

In the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the justifiable ground of protecting public order has been defined in terms mainly of the aims of an impartial and neutral state[19] reconciling the interests of differing groups, ensuring respect for the convictions of all,[20] and maintaining the pluralism and the proper functioning of democracy rather than removing the cause of tensions by doing away with pluralism.[21] The ECtHR held that banning the wearing of headscarves and beards by students in state-run universities in Turkey to preserve the secular nature of the institution served a legitimate aim of protecting public order and was proportionate.[22] In contrast, the HRC has held that the expulsion of a student for refusing to comply with a ban on the wearing of headscarves is a violation of the right to manifest religion where the ban is done without the state invoking any specific ground or justification for imposing the restriction.[23]


[1]See Kokkinakis v Greece, application 14307/88, (ECtHR 1993), para 31: ‘[f]reedom to manifest one's religion is not only exercisable in community with others, “in public” and within the circle of those whose faith one shares, but can also be asserted “alone” and “in private”.’
[2]See also UDHR art 18; CRC arts 12(1), 30; MWCo art 12(1), (2); ECHR art 9(1); ACHR art 12(1). See also Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief art 1(1), Declaration on the Right to Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.
[3]See HRC General Comment 22 para 2. Theistic, non-theistic, atheistic beliefs as well as the right not to profess any religion or belief is protected. See also Kang v Repiblic of Korea communication 878/1999 (HRC 2003) para 7.2.
[4] See HRC General Comment 22 para 4: ‘The concept of worship … [includes] the building of places of worship, the use of ritual formulae and objects, the display of symbols, and the observance of holidays and days of rest’. See also Manoussakis et al v Greece application 18748/9 (ECtHR 1996) paras 41-53, Boodoo v Trinidad and Tobago, communication 721/1996 (HRC 2002) para 6.6.
[5] For example, in Bhinder v Canada communication 208/1986 (HRC 1989), para 6.2, the HRC held that requiring the author, a Sikh who wore a turban in daily life, to wear a safety headgear during work was an interference with his right to manifest his religious beliefs though the restriction was justified under the circumstances.
[6]Boodoo v Trinidad and Tobago.
[7]HRC General Comment 22 para 4.
[8]HRC General Comment 22 para 4. See also Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief art 6(d) and 6(e); Commission on Human Rights resolution 2005/40, 4.d.
[9]Kalaç v Turkey application 20704/92 (ECtHR 1997) para 27.
[10]Hasan & Chaush v Bulgaria application 30985/96 (ECtHR 2000) paras 84-89. See also Larissis & Others v Greece, applications 23372/94, 26377/95, 26378/94 (ECtHR 1998) para 40.
[11] HRC, General Comment 22, para 8.
[12]Kang v Republic of Korea, communication 878/1999 (HRC 2003) para 7.2.
[13]Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v Moldova, application 45701/99 (ECtHR 2002) para 130.
[14]HRC General Comment 22 para 8.
[15]HRC General Comment 22. para 8. See also Kang v Republic of Korea communication 878/1999 (HRC 2003) para 7.2, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the ICCPR para 28.
[16]Bhinder v Canada, communication 208/1986 (HRC 1989), para 6.2. See also Prince v South Africa, communication 255/2002 (ACHPR 2004) paras 41-44.
[17]Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v Moldova, application 45701/99 (ECtHR 2002) paras 111, 113.
[18]Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v Moldova para 130.
[19]Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v Moldova para 116; Hasan & Chaush v Bulgaria, application 30985/96 (ECtHR 2000) para 78.
[20]Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v Moldova, application 45701/99 (ECtHR 2002) paras 115, 119.
[21]Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v Moldova, application 45701/99 (ECtHR 2002) para 116; Serif v Greece, application 38178/97 (ECtHR 1999) para 53.
[22]Leyla Sahin v Turkey application 44774/98, (ECtHR 2005) para 99. See also Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v Turkey, applications 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 & 41344/98 (ECtHR 2003) para 125 where the ECtHR upheld the right of the state to ban a political party whoseplatform included the introduction of elements of Shari'a law in Turkey.
[23]Hudoyberganova v Uzbekistancommunication 931/2000 (HRC 2004) para 6.2. See also the discussion of religious symbols in the report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, E/CN.4/2006/5, paras 36-60.