4.8.2 Choice of residence [art 12(1) ICCPR] Condensed entry: A person lawfully in a State may choose to live wherever he or she wants. No one should be required to apply for permission to change their residence or to seek the approval of the local authorities of the place of destination. Banishment to a particular part of a country interferes with the freedom to choice of residence as does a prohibition from moving to or remaining in a particular place. States are obliged to take action against discriminatory practices by private parties with regard to the right to choice of residence. Any restrictions on the right to choose residence must be provided by law, necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others. Restrictions on residence in areas inhabited by indigenous peoples may be justifiable. Temporary legitimate restrictions on residence, such as legal proceedings, may not be unduly prolonged. Comprehensive entry: According to article 12(1) of the ICCPR everyone has the ‘freedom to choose his residence’. A person lawfully in a State may choose to live wherever he or she wants. Refugees whose status has been determined have the right to choose their residence.[1] No one should be required to apply for permission to change their residence or to seek the approval of the local authorities of the place of destination.[2] Article 12(1) of the ICCPR prohibits interference with the right to movement whether or not the interference emanated from a public or private individual or entity.[3] Thus the right of a woman to choose her residence may not be made subject, by law or practice, to the decision of another person, including a relative.[4] States should take action against such discriminatory practices. (See *discrimination between men and women*). Banishment to a particular part of a country interferes with the freedom to choice of residence as do a prohibition from moving to or remaining in a particular place.[5] In Ackla v Togo, the facts were:[6] Prior to his release on 6 June 1987, Mr Ackla was notified of the President's decision to deny him the right to enter the district of La Kozah (interdiction de séjour) and his native town of Kara, situated in this district. On 24 July 1987, the police once more tried to arrest him when he returned to Kara to retrieve some personal effects. The HRC held that ‘[i]n the absence of any explanation from the State party justifying the restrictions’ the freedom of movement and residence of Mr Ackla had been violated.[7] The freedom of choice of residence implies protection from forced internal displacement.[8] (See *forced displacement*; *forced evictions*). It also precludes preventing the entry or stay of persons in a defined part of the territory. Any restrictions on the right to choose residence must be provided by law, necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others.[9](See *freedom of movement*). Restrictions on residence in areas inhabited by indigenous peoples may be justifiable.[10] However, such restrictions must be reasonable in the circumstances. In Lovelace v Canada, a woman who was born and registered as ‘Maliseet Indian’ had married a ‘non-Indian’ and thereby lost her status as ‘Indian’. The HRC held that to prevent her from returning to the Maliseet reserve after her marriage broke up was unjustifiable.[11] A legal requirement that a person could not move from his or her place of residence until liquidation proceedings had been completed was held to be legitimate by the ECtHR. However, the Court held that the interference was disproportionate in the case at hand as the proceedings had taken more than 14 years to conclude.[12]
[1] Convention Relation to the Status of Refugees arts 26, 31(2). [2] HRC General Comment 27 para 17. See also eg Concluding Observations: Ukraine, CCPR/CO/73/UKR (HRC, 2001), para 19. [3]HRC General Comment 27 para 6. [4]HRC General Comment 27 para 6. [5] Ngalula v Zaire communication 138/1983 (HRC 1986) para 10; Mpaka-Nsusu v Zaire communication 157/1983 (HRC 1986) para 10; Ackla v Togo communication 505/1992 (HRC 1996). [6] Ackla v Togo para 2.3. [7] Ackla v Togo para 10. [8] HRC General Comment 27 para 7. [9] ICCPR art 12(3); HRC General Comment 27 para 4. [10] HRC General Comment 27 para 16 [11] Lovelace v Canada communication 24/1977 (HRC 1980) para 17. [12]Luordo v Italy application 32190/96 (ECtHR 2003) para 96.
Condensed entry:
A person lawfully in a State may choose to live wherever he or she wants. No one should be required to apply for permission to change their residence or to seek the approval of the local authorities of the place of destination. Banishment to a particular part of a country interferes with the freedom to choice of residence as does a prohibition from moving to or remaining in a particular place. States are obliged to take action against discriminatory practices by private parties with regard to the right to choice of residence.
Any restrictions on the right to choose residence must be provided by law, necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others. Restrictions on residence in areas inhabited by indigenous peoples may be justifiable. Temporary legitimate restrictions on residence, such as legal proceedings, may not be unduly prolonged.
Comprehensive entry:
According to article 12(1) of the ICCPR everyone has the ‘freedom to choose his residence’. A person lawfully in a State may choose to live wherever he or she wants. Refugees whose status has been determined have the right to choose their residence.[1]
No one should be required to apply for permission to change their residence or to seek the approval of the local authorities of the place of destination.[2] Article 12(1) of the ICCPR prohibits interference with the right to movement whether or not the interference emanated from a public or private individual or entity.[3] Thus the right of a woman to choose her residence may not be made subject, by law or practice, to the decision of another person, including a relative.[4] States should take action against such discriminatory practices. (See *discrimination between men and women*).
Banishment to a particular part of a country interferes with the freedom to choice of residence as do a prohibition from moving to or remaining in a particular place.[5] In Ackla v Togo, the facts were:[6]
Prior to his release on 6 June 1987, Mr Ackla was notified of the President's decision to deny him the right to enter the district of La Kozah (interdiction de séjour) and his native town of Kara, situated in this district. On 24 July 1987, the police once more tried to arrest him when he returned to Kara to retrieve some personal effects.
The HRC held that ‘[i]n the absence of any explanation from the State party justifying the restrictions’ the freedom of movement and residence of Mr Ackla had been violated.[7]
The freedom of choice of residence implies protection from forced internal displacement.[8] (See *forced displacement*; *forced evictions*). It also precludes preventing the entry or stay of persons in a defined part of the territory.
Any restrictions on the right to choose residence must be provided by law, necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others.[9](See *freedom of movement*).
Restrictions on residence in areas inhabited by indigenous peoples may be justifiable.[10] However, such restrictions must be reasonable in the circumstances. In Lovelace v Canada, a woman who was born and registered as ‘Maliseet Indian’ had married a ‘non-Indian’ and thereby lost her status as ‘Indian’. The HRC held that to prevent her from returning to the Maliseet reserve after her marriage broke up was unjustifiable.[11]
A legal requirement that a person could not move from his or her place of residence until liquidation proceedings had been completed was held to be legitimate by the ECtHR. However, the Court held that the interference was disproportionate in the case at hand as the proceedings had taken more than 14 years to conclude.[12]
[1] Convention Relation to the Status of Refugees arts 26, 31(2).
[2] HRC General Comment 27 para 17. See also eg Concluding Observations: Ukraine, CCPR/CO/73/UKR (HRC, 2001), para 19.
[3]HRC General Comment 27 para 6.
[4]HRC General Comment 27 para 6.
[5] Ngalula v Zaire communication 138/1983 (HRC 1986) para 10; Mpaka-Nsusu v Zaire communication 157/1983 (HRC 1986) para 10; Ackla v Togo communication 505/1992 (HRC 1996).
[6] Ackla v Togo para 2.3.
[7] Ackla v Togo para 10.
[8] HRC General Comment 27 para 7.
[9] ICCPR art 12(3); HRC General Comment 27 para 4.
[10] HRC General Comment 27 para 16
[11] Lovelace v Canada communication 24/1977 (HRC 1980) para 17.
[12]Luordo v Italy application 32190/96 (ECtHR 2003) para 96.