4.2.2 Censorship Condensed entry: Censorship is the prevention of expressionbefore it is disseminated. Censorship has two forms: direct censorship or self-censorship. Direct censorship can take the form of (a) banning of any form of expression in advance of its publication or broadcasting and (b) confiscation of or restrictions on the use of already published material (such as blacking out part of a publication). Censorship is an extreme measure which should only be resorted to exceptionally and requires higher levels of justification than less intrusive restrictions on freedom of expression. Self-censorship is where editors of newspapers or broadcasters do not print or broadcast otherwise newsworthy information out of fear of government reprisal or persecution, or as a result of threats, warnings or physical attacks. Comprehensive entry: Censorship is the prevention of expression before it is disseminated. Censorship has two forms: direct censorship or self-censorship. Censorship can take the form of banning of any form of expression in advance of its publication or broadcasting,[1] confiscation of or restrictions on the use of already published material (such as blacking out part of a publication) (see *confiscation of media property*).[2] Formally, the international test for assessing whether censorship is legitimate is the same three-part test as for all restrictions on freedom of expression(See *interference with opinions held or expressed*). However, when assessing the proportionality of a censorship measure, international courts have stressed that this is a highly intrusive measure that they will scrutinize very carefully indeed. The ACHR explicitly and absolutely prohibits all forms of (prior) censorship, except where this is necessary for the ‘moral protection of childhood and adolescence’, although it is the only human rights treaty to do so.[3] The HRC has held that censorship, in the form of a requirement of prior deposit of all publications is inconsistent with freedom of expression as recognized in article 19 of the ICCPR.[4] The ECtHR has held that ‘the dangers inherent in prior restraints are such that they call for the most careful scrutiny on the part of the Court … news is a perishable commodity and to delay its publication, even for a short period, may well deprive it of all its value and interest’.[5] It is generally agreed that any form of prior vetting of media output would not be justified as a restriction on freedom of expression. States must also avoid imposing onerous licensing conditions and fees on the broadcast media.[6] Furthermore, banning the entry or import, the distribution and circulation of a publication constitute a form of censorship.[7] Self-censorship is where editors of newspapers or broadcasters do not print or broadcast otherwise newsworthy information out of fear of government reprisal or persecution, or as a result of threats, warnings or physical attacks. For instance, the Spanish Constitutional Court ruled unconstitutional a provision in a law which provided for the closing, by judicial decree, of any newspaper that supported terrorism, on grounds, inter alia, that it would lead to self-censorship by journalists, who would fear the consequences of reporting on terrorists' activities, and thus was incompatible with the right to impart and receive information.[8] The IACtHR has held that censorship on grounds of blasphemy falls outside the permitted category of ‘moral protection of the young’.[9] In contrast, the ECtHR held that advertisements offensive to Irish religious beliefs in the audio-visual media may be legitimately stopped.[10] The ECtHR further held that the potential impact of the medium of expression concerned is an important factor in the consideration of the proportionality of censorship and that account must be taken of the fact that the audio-visual media have a more immediate and powerful effect than the print media.[11]
[1]Olmedo Bustos et al v Chile (The Last Temptation of Christ), (IACtHR 2001) para 70. The Court held: ‘freedom of expression is not exhausted in the theoretical recognition of the right to speak or write, but also includes, inseparably, the right to use any appropriate method to disseminate thought and allow it to reach the greatest number of persons’ – para 65; and Francisco Martorell v Chile, Case 11.230, (IAComHR 1996) para 56. [2] Concluding Observations: Gabon, CCPR/CO/70/GAB (2000), para 19. [3] ACHR art 13(2). [4] HRC, Concluding observations: Cameroon (1994) para 13. See also HRC General Comment 25, para 25, [5]The Observer Ltd and ors v United Kingdom application 13585/88 (ECtHR 1991) para 60. [6] HRC Draft General Comment 34, para 41. [7]Francisco Martorell v Chile, Case 11.230, (IAComHR 1996) para 55, 56. [8]Second Anti-Terrorism Act case, STC 199/87, Boletín de Jurisprudencia Constitucional, 81. cited in Article 19 The freedom of expression handbook: International and comparative law, standards and procedures (1993) [9]Olmedo Bustos et al v Chile (The Last Temptation of Christ), (IACtHR 2001) paras 79-80. [10]Murphy v Ireland application 44179/98 (ECtHR 2003) para 82. [11]Murphy v Ireland application 44179/98 (ECtHR 2003) para 74.
Condensed entry:
Censorship is the prevention of expression before it is disseminated. Censorship has two forms: direct censorship or self-censorship. Direct censorship can take the form of (a) banning of any form of expression in advance of its publication or broadcasting and (b) confiscation of or restrictions on the use of already published material (such as blacking out part of a publication). Censorship is an extreme measure which should only be resorted to exceptionally and requires higher levels of justification than less intrusive restrictions on freedom of expression.
Self-censorship is where editors of newspapers or broadcasters do not print or broadcast otherwise newsworthy information out of fear of government reprisal or persecution, or as a result of threats, warnings or physical attacks.
Comprehensive entry:
Censorship is the prevention of expression before it is disseminated. Censorship has two forms: direct censorship or self-censorship. Censorship can take the form of banning of any form of expression in advance of its publication or broadcasting,[1] confiscation of or restrictions on the use of already published material (such as blacking out part of a publication) (see *confiscation of media property*).[2]
Formally, the international test for assessing whether censorship is legitimate is the same three-part test as for all restrictions on freedom of expression(See *interference with opinions held or expressed*). However, when assessing the proportionality of a censorship measure, international courts have stressed that this is a highly intrusive measure that they will scrutinize very carefully indeed.
The ACHR explicitly and absolutely prohibits all forms of (prior) censorship, except where this is necessary for the ‘moral protection of childhood and adolescence’, although it is the only human rights treaty to do so.[3] The HRC has held that censorship, in the form of a requirement of prior deposit of all publications is inconsistent with freedom of expression as recognized in article 19 of the ICCPR.[4] The ECtHR has held that ‘the dangers inherent in prior restraints are such that they call for the most careful scrutiny on the part of the Court … news is a perishable commodity and to delay its publication, even for a short period, may well deprive it of all its value and interest’.[5] It is generally agreed that any form of prior vetting of media output would not be justified as a restriction on freedom of expression. States must also avoid imposing onerous licensing conditions and fees on the broadcast media.[6] Furthermore, banning the entry or import, the distribution and circulation of a publication constitute a form of censorship.[7]
Self-censorship is where editors of newspapers or broadcasters do not print or broadcast otherwise newsworthy information out of fear of government reprisal or persecution, or as a result of threats, warnings or physical attacks. For instance, the Spanish Constitutional Court ruled unconstitutional a provision in a law which provided for the closing, by judicial decree, of any newspaper that supported terrorism, on grounds, inter alia, that it would lead to self-censorship by journalists, who would fear the consequences of reporting on terrorists' activities, and thus was incompatible with the right to impart and receive information.[8]
The IACtHR has held that censorship on grounds of blasphemy falls outside the permitted category of ‘moral protection of the young’.[9] In contrast, the ECtHR held that advertisements offensive to Irish religious beliefs in the audio-visual media may be legitimately stopped.[10] The ECtHR further held that the potential impact of the medium of expression concerned is an important factor in the consideration of the proportionality of censorship and that account must be taken of the fact that the audio-visual media have a more immediate and powerful effect than the print media.[11]
[1] Olmedo Bustos et al v Chile (The Last Temptation of Christ), (IACtHR 2001) para 70. The Court held: ‘freedom of expression is not exhausted in the theoretical recognition of the right to speak or write, but also includes, inseparably, the right to use any appropriate method to disseminate thought and allow it to reach the greatest number of persons’ – para 65; and Francisco Martorell v Chile, Case 11.230, (IAComHR 1996) para 56.
[2] Concluding Observations: Gabon, CCPR/CO/70/GAB (2000), para 19.
[3] ACHR art 13(2).
[4] HRC, Concluding observations: Cameroon (1994) para 13. See also HRC General Comment 25, para 25,
[5] The Observer Ltd and ors v United Kingdom application 13585/88 (ECtHR 1991) para 60.
[6] HRC Draft General Comment 34, para 41.
[7] Francisco Martorell v Chile, Case 11.230, (IAComHR 1996) para 55, 56.
[8] Second Anti-Terrorism Act case, STC 199/87, Boletín de Jurisprudencia Constitucional, 81. cited in Article 19 The freedom of expression handbook: International and comparative law, standards and procedures (1993)
[9] Olmedo Bustos et al v Chile (The Last Temptation of Christ), (IACtHR 2001) paras 79-80.
[10] Murphy v Ireland application 44179/98 (ECtHR 2003) para 82.
[11] Murphy v Ireland application 44179/98 (ECtHR 2003) para 74.